Response Paper #3

Jessie Latter

GVPT200

24 October 2013

Response Paper #3

            The Syrian Civil War broke out in 2011 because rebel forces wanted to remove President Bashar al-Assad and his regime from power. Only after discovering that the Syrian government had been using chemicals weapons to kill civilians did the international community, more specifically the United States and President Obama, start talking about humanitarian intervention. In the blog post “Words of Mass Destruction in the Syria Debate”, Ty Solomon inquires into why, only after the use of non-conventional weapons like WMDs, do countries like the US and UK want to intervene in Syria? (Solomon). Ultimately, Solomon attributes this to the taboo attached WMDs and argues that when deciding when to intervene words like WMDs and conventional weapons should not have as much influence because conventional weapons cause more mass destruction then chemical weapons (Solomon). I agree with Solomon because the outrage from the international community should not have occurred only after discovering the use of chemicals weapons, but when the government was committing mass genocide against civilians with conventional weapons as well. I also think that if a full-fledged humanitarian intervention were to happen in Syria it should not be by using military force, but by providing aid to the Syrian people in the form of goods/services.

            The arbitrary categories that we place weapons into as either conventional or WMDs makes it seem as though the death toll when using WMDs is a lot higher and more devastating then conventional weapons. Although this was true of the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki during WWII, the fact is that WMDs do not cause as much mass destruction as conventional weapons do. The death toll before the use of chemical weapons was 100,000+, while the chemical weapons bombings only killed 1,000+ civilians. The Syrian Civil War has been going on for two years and countries like the US knew how many civilians were dying over there and refused to talk about intervening until they crossed the red line by using chemical weapons. This red line should have been drawn after the first civilian was killed, not just by chemical weapons but by conventional weapons as well. A death is a death and the focus should not be on how that person died but that they did at the hands of their own government.

            No one wants to have a repeat of Iraq or Afghanistan in Syria, which is why I think that if humanitarian intervention were to occur it should not be by using military force. When the US sent troops into Iraq and Afghanistan the government underestimated the time, money, and resources it would take to accomplish their goals there. Although in the case of Syria it is confirmed that they do have WMDs, the US should still not repeat past mistakes by using military force to overthrow President Bashar al-Assad and his regime. Instead, I think the US government should provide aid to the Syrian people in the form of goods/services because women, men, and children are living in a country in the midst of a civil war resulting in the destruction of homes, spreading of disease, and decline in the availability of food and water. Using military force to overthrow the Syrian government will not mean anything if the death toll continues to rise and a large portion of the population is dead from a lack of access to basic necessities. 

Artem Muchnik

Mark Shirk

GVPT200

Response paper #2: Power: A Radical View

In the reading Power: A Radical View, Steven Lukes offers a decent view at power in my opinion and the way he does it is that he covers the view of power from three different perspectives; One-Dimensional, Two-Dimensional, and Three-Dimensional. In my opinion the most common view of power in the current world now is the Three-Dimensional view of power. I believe this due to the fact that it focuses on decision-making and control over political agenda, issues and potential issues, observable and latent conflict, and finally subjective and real interests. This is easy to see in the current world because for example for focus (a) in the current world in every government power is harnessed through the political agenda; such as when it is decided to go to war, it is all because of power and is lead by political decisions to do so. The other parts of the Three-Dimensional view of power fall under the first parts quite well; when a decision is made in the interest of power all other (b) issues and potential issues with another state for example fuel the power struggle even more, along with any (c) conflicts previously had with the two parties in the power struggle, and both parties (d) interests are to resolve the conflict usually and still retain said power.

The one-dimensional view, often called the ‘pluralist view’ of power focuses mostly on who prevails in cases of decision making, thus the locus of power is determined, compared to the two-dimensional view where power embraces coercion, influence, authority, force and manipulation. While the three dimensional view of power involves a thoroughgoing critique of the behavioral focus of the first two views. This makes the three-dimensional view more sophisticated and more versatile in my opinion.

A very important part of power is in fact coercion, as mentioned in the two-dimensional view of power. If A can get B to do what A wants and B cannot stand up against A’s attacks, then in fact it is a very successful type of power, and almost every if not all conflicts had historically were achieved this way; for example during WW2, the allies won against the axis due to their superiority power-wise and thus through coercion triumphed as they were able to get the axis powers to do as they wanted due to their power. Along with that comes influence because when one has power they have significantly more influence over what goes on politically, and in order to have that one needs a significant amount of authority.

Another way to see power is through force and manipulation; for example when one state has a lot of power is may easily force or manipulate another state to get what it wants; for example if one state has power over the economy of another state it can use that to manipulate what it wants to an extent form the other state.
Overall I believe that all three are important to be utilized in order to have the proper view and control of power, but the more prevalent and more current perspective is the third-dimensional view because it encompasses the first and second dimensional views of power, therefore being the most efficient view.

Rory McClurg

GVPT200

     The causes of the Iraq War have been a hotly debated topic since the war began. Two scholars, Debs and Montiero of Yale University, have made the most compelling argument about the causes of the Iraq war I have read to date. They break their argument down into three main points, the prevention of a nuclear Iraq, imperfect information, and the post-9/11 world, which, if researched, can be supported by facts about the post 9/11 world.

     Debs and Montiero claim the United State’s main motivation to start the Iraq War was to prevent a nuclear Iraq. This statement makes complete sense when you consider the United States’ interests in the Middle East (i.e. oil, military, etc.) and how important those resources are to our well being. Also, as Debs and Montiero claim, a nuclear Iraq would also sway the balance of power out of the favor of Israel, a key ally of the US. If this scenario were to occur, as the US feared at the time, the power of the US in the Middle East would be drastically weakened. This potential upheaval of the power structure in the Middle East, made a conflict with Iraq inevitable, as it was never our intention to lose influence in this strategic location in the world.

     The desire to prevent a nuclear Iraq would never have materialized if not for two crucial factors according to Debs and Montiero. These factors are, the imperfect info about the Iraqi WMD program and the post 9/11 attitude towards potential threats. Saddam Hussein never was committal on whether he had nuclear weapons, this created an illusion in the minds of the major players in the Middle East and around the world that Iraq may have a weapons program. The UN then sent weapons inspectors in, and came up with no irrefutable evidence there were no weapons of mass destruction in Iraq’s possession. The result of the inspection heightened US fear and suspicion of the Iraqi’s possessing WMD to astronomical levels. The US in years past wouldn’t have been so forceful with their actions, but, considering the post-9/11 hysteria that had engulfed the US, the main priority was to prevent high impact events such as 9/11. This was coined the 1% doctrine. Adding to these facts, the US lost trust in the intelligence community to bring threats to light in a timely manner. So distant possibilities, such as the possibility that Iraq had WMD had to be treated as if they were highly probable events.

     This toxic mix of factors, the desire to prevent a nuclear Iraq, imperfect information about the Iraqi WMD program, and the post-9/11 mindset, all outlined by Debs and Montiero are the most probable factors that contributed to the commencement of the Iraq War.

Jack Murphy

Mr. Shirk

International Relations

7 October 2013           

Power and Fear

            In Mearsheimer’s, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, “Power and Fear” section, I agree, for the most part with what he believes in with a few exceptions and limitations. Mearsheimer seems to press the idea of fearing other states and using offensive reactions excessively. While it is important to keep aware of what other states are doing, while having some uncertainty of other states, the extent of worry, which Mearsheimer suggests, seems to be excessive and impractical.

            Yes, it is true that states have, “offensive military capability that they can use against each other”, and that, “one can never be certain that other states do not intend to use that power against oneself” (pg. 43), but this does not mean we have to fear every great power. For example, there is no need for the United States to fear Great Britain if they somehow become more powerful. Ostensibly, no great power will act irrationally, meaning that there would be plenty of warning and clear signs of a great power changing ideals and of a possible attack or start of a war. We must not fear every nation in order to make our economy grow. If we do simply fear, our economy would not prosper as much, which would hurt the strength of our military. In some cases it does make sense to fear great powers such as the U.S. fearing the Soviet Union during the Cold War, but it was transparent that they could be an immediate threat to us.

            This brings up another point of Mearsheimer with which I disagree. Mearsheimer states, “rival states that possess nuclear forces that can survive a nuclear attack and retaliate against it are likely to fear each other less than if these same states had no nuclear weapons” (Pg. 43-44). Mearsheimer’s logic does make sense, but during the Cold War the amount of tension and fear the states had, including the citizens, was the greatest it could possibly be. The thought that there could be a nuclear attack on the homeland struck more fear in people than the thought of a war. I do agree with Mearsheimer though that, “nuclear-armed rivals are going to be reluctant to fight with each other”(pg. 44).

            There is no need to fear countries as much as Mearsheimer suggests. While power is important, and through fear we can determine the amount of power we need and have, we cannot live in constant fear of other states, as it will have negative effects on ours. Some amount of suspicions is necessary though to protect us. Great powers will not act irrationally and out of nowhere attack us. This is why we must not fear as greatly as Mearsheimer proposes.

Response Paper #2

Jessie Latter

GVPT 200

7 October 2013

Response Paper #2: Reading 1 Debs and Monteiro

         In the article “Known Unknowns: Power Shifts, Uncertainty, and War”, Debs and Monteiro give a rationalist account of the causes of the war and argue that the rationalist framework should not be abandoned if it can be amended to include endogenous power shifts. Debs and Monteiro also defend the rationalist theory against alternative approaches like that of David Lake who thinks that a rationalist account cannot explain the Iraq war (Debs and Monteiro 5). I agree with Debs and Monteiro’s argument defending the rationalist explanation of the Iraq war and the need to acknowledge exogenous as well as endogenous power shifts, although I did not support the war itself, because they give four rational points explaining why the United States went to war.

          Rationalists see war as a last resort because it is costly; therefore bargaining is the best option. But in the midst of the possible nuclearization of Iraq, the Bush Administration decided that a preventative war against Iraq was the best decision. Debs and Monteiro do not attempt to defend the Bush Administration’s decision to go to war but rather reflect back on it from a rationalist perspective. Their first point is that the United States wanted to prevent a shift in the balance of power that would result from Iraq’s nuclearization (Debs and Monteiro 1). I agree with this point because if Saddamm actually did have nuclear weapons and was allowed to continue developing WMD then they could declare nuclear war on other countries. The next point is that the events of 9/11 led leaders to worry about the country’s ability to detect security threats (Debs and Monteiro 2). I agree with this point because if Iraq’s possible nuclearization had occurred before 9/11 had happened then we probably would not have been so quick to go to war based on such unreliable evidence. Debs and Monteiro’s third point is that the United States went to war out of uncertainty and fear about Saddam possessing WMD (Debs and Monteiro 3). I agree with this point because the United States wanted proof that Iraq had nuclear weapons and when UN inspectors could not answer their questions, the uncertainty breed fear. Their final point is that rationalist theory can explain why the United States decided to go to war with Iraq instead of North Korea (Debs and Monteiro 4). I agree with this point because at the time North Korea did in fact have nuclear weapons and the likelihood of coming to an agreement was a lot less likely compared to Iraq. Debs and Monteiro reiterate throughout the article that although the rationalist theory can explain why the United States went to war with Iraq it does not support that decision. If rationalist theory takes into account endogenous power shifts that result in states militarizing we can better understand the decision to enter into war with Iraq (Debs and Monteiro 14).

          After Debs and Monteiro make their argument defending the rationalist theory they address David Lake’s argument that IR theory needs a behavioral revolution. I agree with the counter-arguments Debs and Monteiro make in response to David Lake’s criticism because although the rationalist explanation of the Iraq war is not perfect, it is still a widely accepted interpretation and gives reasonable reasons like imperfect information and commitment problems as the cause of war.

          I agree with Debs and Monteiro defending the rationalist explanation of what caused the Iraq war and the need to treat power shifts as exogenous and endogenous because they give four rational points that led the United States to war.

Blog #2: Debs and Monterio

Dana Kravitz

Reason for Invading Iraq

            In 2003 the American troops invaded Iraq, and it is still very controversial as to the true reason that the U.S. did so. Debs’ and Morterio’s article as well as Lake’s make very compelling points as to why the war happened but, overall I believe that Alex Debs and Nuno Morterio, in Known Unknowns: Power Shifts, Uncertainty, and War, had the strongest points. Morterio and Debs explain the reasons for war as the fear of Iraq’s nuclear weapons, America’s strong nationalism after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and the conflicting reports from the UN. Overall, the fear that Iraq induced, through many areas especially nuclear weapons, made America feel that invading Iraq was going to be well worth it.

            The United States thought they had reason to believe that Saddam was developing weapons of mass destruction. With an unstable country and leader the thought of this happening is extremely scary. The U.S. felt that attacking then was more cost efficient based on the fact that the possibility of having nuclear weapons was weak but would gain strength over time. This shows how the war was very fear based. Not about what happened on 9/11 or what was happening in Iraq but about could happen if they got nuclear power.

            The U.S. was especially sensitive to the idea of terrorists getting a hold of nuclear weapons. After 9/11 America was worried about another attack and it was not difficult to convince them that war was the best option because of the strong sense of nationalism at the time. The government as well as the population was fearful of these terrorist organizations. Though they did not know for sure whether they actually existed or not the fear of the WMD were enough to convince them. Debs and Morterio speak about the one percent doctrine.  “This doctrine suggests that, in the post-9/11 security environment, the United States must deal with ‘low-probability, high-impact’ events as if they were certain.” This again shows how in post 9/11 America, fear lead all decision making. Even though something occurring was not 100 percent certain, they treated it like it was just to be cautious.

            Even though inspectors from the UN were sent in to search for WMDs the results were still vague. The UN’s findings did not help the U.S. relinquish any fear. They wanted a definite no, and when they were given a maybe, the United States government did not feel that was sufficed. Though we later found out that they did not have nuclear weapons, the fear that it was a possibility was enough to send the U.S. into war.

            Monterio and Debs show how the war happened because of the possibility of Iraq’s nuclear weapons, the possibility of terrorists getting those nuclear weapons, and the confusing reports given about whether the nuclear weapons existed. Though the reason for war definitely had to do with nuclear weapons, it also was based on the fear of what could come instead of the facts that were actually happening. Being afraid can make anyone act irrationally, and the U.S. government, especially the Republicans, did not think safety was a risk worth taking. Personally I feel the war was not necessarily worth the cost but never the less, it took away some of Americas fear and I guess that is worth something.  

 

 

 

 

Respone Paper #2 Whitney Lazo

Whitney Lazo

October 4, 2013

            Every state strives for power in order to be dominant and the most important aspect is hard power, while soft power plays a less crucial, yet still significant role. It is important for a state to have hard power so they can protect themselves and pose as a threat to others, therefore other states will not be a danger to them. Soft power is only important once a state has obtained as much hard power as possible. Soft power proves a state’s credibility based on culture. As Steven Lukes states in “Power: A Radial View”, power is based off of what A can influence B to do and how. The influence begins with physical strength and is guaranteed with the political and social aspects of the state.

            The most important part of power is coercion. This can be determined by observing the winners of conflicts and how the victory was achieved. In history, all conflicts are achieved with war or strength. In World War II, the Allies won the conflict of dangerous dictatorship against Germany and other states by military force.  America won the Mexican American War because of their military advantage over Mexico. America was then granted the title of a continental power. If A can get B to do what A wants because B cannot compete against such strong threats or attacks, that is the most successful type of power[1].  Therefore, power is based mostly off of control. The amount of control one state has over another is the amount of power they obtain, to an extent.

            The remainder of a states power is credited to persuasion and cultural influence. A state will be considered powerful if they have modern technology, impressive academics, and a good reputation around the world. For example, Adolf Hitler built up a very strong force in order to capture the vast amount of land that he did. He also was able to persuade the people of Germany to support him and his anti-semitic views. However, to the rest of the world Hitler and Nazi Germany did not demonstrate an awarding society, and therefore were not powerful enough. On the other hand, America in the mid nineteenth century exhibited a great deal of soft power due to the advancement in technology and enticing culture. Because of this, America attracted a rush of immigrants. It is important to obtain soft power in order to validate hard power. Soft power guarantees a respectable reputation to the rest of the world. If B wishes to emulate A, A has achieved soft power.

            Both military strength and culture determine a states power. However, it is the balance between the two that are most important. Military strength must come first in order to be victorious in war and pose a threat to ward off dangers. This will then secure the state. Persuasion is then important in order to convince the world that a state has everything they want. Because power is based off of influence around the world, a state with the most military influence has achieved power, yet if this state now achieves a higher status in culture it has gained the maximum amount of power.

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[1] Lukes, Steven. “Power: A Radical View”. The Macmillian Press Ltd, London and Basingstoke, 1974.