Jack Murphy

Mr. Shirk

International Relations

7 October 2013           

Power and Fear

            In Mearsheimer’s, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, “Power and Fear” section, I agree, for the most part with what he believes in with a few exceptions and limitations. Mearsheimer seems to press the idea of fearing other states and using offensive reactions excessively. While it is important to keep aware of what other states are doing, while having some uncertainty of other states, the extent of worry, which Mearsheimer suggests, seems to be excessive and impractical.

            Yes, it is true that states have, “offensive military capability that they can use against each other”, and that, “one can never be certain that other states do not intend to use that power against oneself” (pg. 43), but this does not mean we have to fear every great power. For example, there is no need for the United States to fear Great Britain if they somehow become more powerful. Ostensibly, no great power will act irrationally, meaning that there would be plenty of warning and clear signs of a great power changing ideals and of a possible attack or start of a war. We must not fear every nation in order to make our economy grow. If we do simply fear, our economy would not prosper as much, which would hurt the strength of our military. In some cases it does make sense to fear great powers such as the U.S. fearing the Soviet Union during the Cold War, but it was transparent that they could be an immediate threat to us.

            This brings up another point of Mearsheimer with which I disagree. Mearsheimer states, “rival states that possess nuclear forces that can survive a nuclear attack and retaliate against it are likely to fear each other less than if these same states had no nuclear weapons” (Pg. 43-44). Mearsheimer’s logic does make sense, but during the Cold War the amount of tension and fear the states had, including the citizens, was the greatest it could possibly be. The thought that there could be a nuclear attack on the homeland struck more fear in people than the thought of a war. I do agree with Mearsheimer though that, “nuclear-armed rivals are going to be reluctant to fight with each other”(pg. 44).

            There is no need to fear countries as much as Mearsheimer suggests. While power is important, and through fear we can determine the amount of power we need and have, we cannot live in constant fear of other states, as it will have negative effects on ours. Some amount of suspicions is necessary though to protect us. Great powers will not act irrationally and out of nowhere attack us. This is why we must not fear as greatly as Mearsheimer proposes.

Response Paper #2

Jessie Latter

GVPT 200

7 October 2013

Response Paper #2: Reading 1 Debs and Monteiro

         In the article “Known Unknowns: Power Shifts, Uncertainty, and War”, Debs and Monteiro give a rationalist account of the causes of the war and argue that the rationalist framework should not be abandoned if it can be amended to include endogenous power shifts. Debs and Monteiro also defend the rationalist theory against alternative approaches like that of David Lake who thinks that a rationalist account cannot explain the Iraq war (Debs and Monteiro 5). I agree with Debs and Monteiro’s argument defending the rationalist explanation of the Iraq war and the need to acknowledge exogenous as well as endogenous power shifts, although I did not support the war itself, because they give four rational points explaining why the United States went to war.

          Rationalists see war as a last resort because it is costly; therefore bargaining is the best option. But in the midst of the possible nuclearization of Iraq, the Bush Administration decided that a preventative war against Iraq was the best decision. Debs and Monteiro do not attempt to defend the Bush Administration’s decision to go to war but rather reflect back on it from a rationalist perspective. Their first point is that the United States wanted to prevent a shift in the balance of power that would result from Iraq’s nuclearization (Debs and Monteiro 1). I agree with this point because if Saddamm actually did have nuclear weapons and was allowed to continue developing WMD then they could declare nuclear war on other countries. The next point is that the events of 9/11 led leaders to worry about the country’s ability to detect security threats (Debs and Monteiro 2). I agree with this point because if Iraq’s possible nuclearization had occurred before 9/11 had happened then we probably would not have been so quick to go to war based on such unreliable evidence. Debs and Monteiro’s third point is that the United States went to war out of uncertainty and fear about Saddam possessing WMD (Debs and Monteiro 3). I agree with this point because the United States wanted proof that Iraq had nuclear weapons and when UN inspectors could not answer their questions, the uncertainty breed fear. Their final point is that rationalist theory can explain why the United States decided to go to war with Iraq instead of North Korea (Debs and Monteiro 4). I agree with this point because at the time North Korea did in fact have nuclear weapons and the likelihood of coming to an agreement was a lot less likely compared to Iraq. Debs and Monteiro reiterate throughout the article that although the rationalist theory can explain why the United States went to war with Iraq it does not support that decision. If rationalist theory takes into account endogenous power shifts that result in states militarizing we can better understand the decision to enter into war with Iraq (Debs and Monteiro 14).

          After Debs and Monteiro make their argument defending the rationalist theory they address David Lake’s argument that IR theory needs a behavioral revolution. I agree with the counter-arguments Debs and Monteiro make in response to David Lake’s criticism because although the rationalist explanation of the Iraq war is not perfect, it is still a widely accepted interpretation and gives reasonable reasons like imperfect information and commitment problems as the cause of war.

          I agree with Debs and Monteiro defending the rationalist explanation of what caused the Iraq war and the need to treat power shifts as exogenous and endogenous because they give four rational points that led the United States to war.

Blog #2: Debs and Monterio

Dana Kravitz

Reason for Invading Iraq

            In 2003 the American troops invaded Iraq, and it is still very controversial as to the true reason that the U.S. did so. Debs’ and Morterio’s article as well as Lake’s make very compelling points as to why the war happened but, overall I believe that Alex Debs and Nuno Morterio, in Known Unknowns: Power Shifts, Uncertainty, and War, had the strongest points. Morterio and Debs explain the reasons for war as the fear of Iraq’s nuclear weapons, America’s strong nationalism after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and the conflicting reports from the UN. Overall, the fear that Iraq induced, through many areas especially nuclear weapons, made America feel that invading Iraq was going to be well worth it.

            The United States thought they had reason to believe that Saddam was developing weapons of mass destruction. With an unstable country and leader the thought of this happening is extremely scary. The U.S. felt that attacking then was more cost efficient based on the fact that the possibility of having nuclear weapons was weak but would gain strength over time. This shows how the war was very fear based. Not about what happened on 9/11 or what was happening in Iraq but about could happen if they got nuclear power.

            The U.S. was especially sensitive to the idea of terrorists getting a hold of nuclear weapons. After 9/11 America was worried about another attack and it was not difficult to convince them that war was the best option because of the strong sense of nationalism at the time. The government as well as the population was fearful of these terrorist organizations. Though they did not know for sure whether they actually existed or not the fear of the WMD were enough to convince them. Debs and Morterio speak about the one percent doctrine.  “This doctrine suggests that, in the post-9/11 security environment, the United States must deal with ‘low-probability, high-impact’ events as if they were certain.” This again shows how in post 9/11 America, fear lead all decision making. Even though something occurring was not 100 percent certain, they treated it like it was just to be cautious.

            Even though inspectors from the UN were sent in to search for WMDs the results were still vague. The UN’s findings did not help the U.S. relinquish any fear. They wanted a definite no, and when they were given a maybe, the United States government did not feel that was sufficed. Though we later found out that they did not have nuclear weapons, the fear that it was a possibility was enough to send the U.S. into war.

            Monterio and Debs show how the war happened because of the possibility of Iraq’s nuclear weapons, the possibility of terrorists getting those nuclear weapons, and the confusing reports given about whether the nuclear weapons existed. Though the reason for war definitely had to do with nuclear weapons, it also was based on the fear of what could come instead of the facts that were actually happening. Being afraid can make anyone act irrationally, and the U.S. government, especially the Republicans, did not think safety was a risk worth taking. Personally I feel the war was not necessarily worth the cost but never the less, it took away some of Americas fear and I guess that is worth something.  

 

 

 

 

Respone Paper #2 Whitney Lazo

Whitney Lazo

October 4, 2013

            Every state strives for power in order to be dominant and the most important aspect is hard power, while soft power plays a less crucial, yet still significant role. It is important for a state to have hard power so they can protect themselves and pose as a threat to others, therefore other states will not be a danger to them. Soft power is only important once a state has obtained as much hard power as possible. Soft power proves a state’s credibility based on culture. As Steven Lukes states in “Power: A Radial View”, power is based off of what A can influence B to do and how. The influence begins with physical strength and is guaranteed with the political and social aspects of the state.

            The most important part of power is coercion. This can be determined by observing the winners of conflicts and how the victory was achieved. In history, all conflicts are achieved with war or strength. In World War II, the Allies won the conflict of dangerous dictatorship against Germany and other states by military force.  America won the Mexican American War because of their military advantage over Mexico. America was then granted the title of a continental power. If A can get B to do what A wants because B cannot compete against such strong threats or attacks, that is the most successful type of power[1].  Therefore, power is based mostly off of control. The amount of control one state has over another is the amount of power they obtain, to an extent.

            The remainder of a states power is credited to persuasion and cultural influence. A state will be considered powerful if they have modern technology, impressive academics, and a good reputation around the world. For example, Adolf Hitler built up a very strong force in order to capture the vast amount of land that he did. He also was able to persuade the people of Germany to support him and his anti-semitic views. However, to the rest of the world Hitler and Nazi Germany did not demonstrate an awarding society, and therefore were not powerful enough. On the other hand, America in the mid nineteenth century exhibited a great deal of soft power due to the advancement in technology and enticing culture. Because of this, America attracted a rush of immigrants. It is important to obtain soft power in order to validate hard power. Soft power guarantees a respectable reputation to the rest of the world. If B wishes to emulate A, A has achieved soft power.

            Both military strength and culture determine a states power. However, it is the balance between the two that are most important. Military strength must come first in order to be victorious in war and pose a threat to ward off dangers. This will then secure the state. Persuasion is then important in order to convince the world that a state has everything they want. Because power is based off of influence around the world, a state with the most military influence has achieved power, yet if this state now achieves a higher status in culture it has gained the maximum amount of power.

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[1] Lukes, Steven. “Power: A Radical View”. The Macmillian Press Ltd, London and Basingstoke, 1974. 

International Relations Response Paper

Rory McClurg

GVPT200

     The world has no overarching authority to arbitrate and solve problems, thus the world is in anarchy. With this fact established, states, much like people, all act in their own best interest. In an unforgiving world, a realist style agenda is the most dominant form of foreign policy in the realm of world politics. This idea has been reflected in international politics, United States foreign policy, and the trends of dominant states.

     Realists would say that the motive behind every decision a state makes in the international political scene is to further what they call, “the national interest.” In addition, they believe cooperation is virtually impossible. This notion is completely confirmed by the creation of the United Nations, which is supposed to represent all countries, but instead favors just the powerful ones. During the creation of the UN, a security council tasked with international peace and security, basically meaning everything involving the military. The Security Council was established with five permanent members, the most powerful nations in the world at the time, and ten members who are elected serve two-year terms. These ten other members are just for show. The only states who have real power are the five permanent members, who have veto powers. This is true because each of the top players at creation of the United Nations, China, France, Russia, Great Britain, and the US were all looking to give themselves as much of an upper hand as possible militarily. Military power is a fundamental aspect of realism; and this Security Council reinforces how important military power is to the nations of the world. This fact furthers the argument of the dominance of realism in the world of international politics.

     The United States foreign policy post 1950 is based on the concept of relative power and dominance. The US was locked in a brutal cold war, pitting the two global hegemons against the each other, each trying to become the world’s dominant power.  The US took every possible opportunity to weaken the Soviet Union. The idea of relative power dictated the US foreign policy so much, that the US would take a loss as long as it caused a bigger loss for the Soviet Union. During the Soviet-Afghan war, the US provided the mujahideen, an untrustworthy “ally” to say the least, with millions of dollars worth of weapons, a relative loss for the US. As a direct consequence to this action, the Soviet Union started to lose this war, ultimately, one of the reasons for the dissolution of the Soviet State. With the absence of the USSR, the US became the most dominant power in the world economically and militarily. The United States foreign policy reflects the dominance of the realist policy, and the importance of the power.

     The fact that military strength and security is equivalent to dominance is no secret. Most of the successful dominant powers turn their national economic opulence into massive upsizing of the military, solidifying their status as a dominant power. The importance of the military is a static element of the most important states in world history, from the time of the Romans unto the present. To be considered a dominant power, one must be militarily strong. The Romans turned their economic dominance into military power, highlighting the importance of security and protection of their economic assets, or as some would say, their national interest. The same is true with Great Britain during their era of dominance, they realized that in order to be dominant and protect the national interest they must maintain a massive military, the same can be said for the US.

     In conclusion, the structure of the current UN, the dominance of the United States, and the common trends of dominant states throughout history all reaffirm the fact that a realist style of policy will always be the most dominant.

Artem Muchnik

Mark Shirk

GVPT200

Response paper #1: Six Principles of Political Realism by Hans J. Morgenthau

Of the different political theories, I personally think that Morgenthau’s theory of political realism is one of the most sensible approaches to politics in the current world, even though that approach is slightly outdated. With the theory of realism it is possible one of the safest ways to approach politics in the current world because of all the current conflicts going on in the world; and the theory of realism revolving around such concepts as power, security and states in anarchy. Realism in my opinion is possibly the most successful theory due to the idea of self-help for the government. In the reading Hans Morgenthau clearly demonstrates why Realism is possibly the most sensible way to live by for a state by using the six principles of realism.

Principle one states that, “Political realism believes that politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature.” In my opinion meaning that in order to function properly the laws governing the state have to be reasonable, and in the society’s favor. The second principle of realism is more openly interpreted as it has to do with the power of the state; and in order to succeed in international politics it is important to have interest defined in terms of power. “We assume that statesmen think and act in terms of interest defined as power” I assume that means that the statesmen are more concerned with the power aspect of politics in order to maintain the security of the state. The third principle of political realism is similar to the second one in terms of power; but its other important point is that power isn’t always the fixed concept once and for all. In the fourth principle Morgenthau states, “Political realism is aware of the moral significance of political action” which means that it is important for the states’ government to address problems in a rational and moral way. The fifth principle correlates with the fourth and is that in political realism the states will not disclose their real moral aspirations. Finally the sixth principle finishes off by stating, “He thinks in terms of interest defined as power” when addressing the political realist.

For example in the current world and the conflict in Syria, a realist approach is probably the more rational way to deal with it. Although the president of Syria could justify his actions under a political theory, in our political view it is immoral; and the USA’s involvement would not be the best approach due to the fact that it would possibly arise more problems for the USA, although if we followed the self-help approach and avoided this conflict I presume we might be better off.

Overall, the concept of realism might be outdated, but in my opinion its one of the most plausible theories due to the fact that it creates a more secure environment for the state, and since security is equivalent to physical survival it is an important theory to employ for the state’s prosperity. 

Dana Kravitz

Mark Shirk

GVPT200

Feminism

            In J. Ann Tickner’s, A Critique of Morgenthau’s Principles of Political Realism she explores Morgenthau’s realist perspective and compares it to her own feminist perspective. Tickner feels that the feminist viewpoint is more representative of the world, and I have to agree.  In the beginning of the paper Tickner lists the six principles that Morgenthau lays out in his writing and at the end of the paper she parallels this with six principles of her feminist theories of international relations. By comparing the two it is clear that Tickner’s principles, that include both masculine and feminine perspectives, are the more modern idea.

            The first principle of realism is that “politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature.” The feminist viewpoint argues that this objectivity only focuses on the “masculine view of human nature.” And because human nature is made up of both feminine and masculine, the realist principle does not work. I believe this exemplifies how realists are inhibiting themselves by only thinking about a small part of the population.

            The next realist principle is that “political realism stresses the rational, objective, and unemotional.” But, the Tickner argues, that world “demands cooperative rather than zero sum solutions.” In a world where nuclear war is a possibility with the world’s strong powers, it is important to work together rather than just jump into war. I think it is unrealistic for Morgenthau to think that there can be no emotion to go into international relations. Whether he likes it or not, everyone has a moral code and the feminist view balances both this idea with the idea of being a strong power.

            The realist perspective only sees power as “control of man over man” This “ignores the idea of collective empowerment” that the feminist principles point out. The world rules do not have to be if one country gains the other must loose. In todays world there can multiple benefactors to a countries gains. The EU is a great example of how different states can work together and not fight to be the most powerful but instead support each other.

            Realist principles explain that though they see that there is a moral code they think it is necessary to separate this from political action. Tickner disagrees with this because she feels both are important. I think that though it is important for a state to make political gains and show their political power it is also important, especially as a democratic state, to take action because it is the right thing to do. For example, though going into Syria would show the worlds powers that the U.S. is not a force to mess with, it is also important to intervene because so many civilians are dying. This conflict shows the balance between masculine and feminine ideals that a state should have.

            Though, feminist see that not all states follow the same moral code, they believe that most states do follow “universal moral principles” and these principles can lead to “de-escalating international conflict and building international community.” Realists refuse to see international relations having anything to so with morals. The feminist perspective is definitely more accurate and positive. The realist perspective expects the worst out of states. Instead, the feminist perspective acknowledges that though not all states have the same morals, it also sees a way to better the world rather than to stubbornly stick with how they have always been.

            Morgenthau’s final principle the political sphere should be autonomous and that a “political man” would be the ideal ruler because he would “be completely lacking moral constraints.” Tickner believes that this view “excludes the concerns and contributions of women. I believe that to think of a state, as being completely autonomous is unrealistic. Not only is this a completely masculine view, but also states depend on other states all the time. It is important for a state to create allies and relationships with other states. Though I agree that ones own state must come first, I think that being autonomous is a bad strategy for international relations.

            Through the comparison of Morgenthau’s and Tickner’s six principles of international relations, it is clear to me that feminism is in fact the more “realistic” view and realism is the short-sided view of the past.