Response Paper #2

Jessie Latter

GVPT 200

7 October 2013

Response Paper #2: Reading 1 Debs and Monteiro

         In the article “Known Unknowns: Power Shifts, Uncertainty, and War”, Debs and Monteiro give a rationalist account of the causes of the war and argue that the rationalist framework should not be abandoned if it can be amended to include endogenous power shifts. Debs and Monteiro also defend the rationalist theory against alternative approaches like that of David Lake who thinks that a rationalist account cannot explain the Iraq war (Debs and Monteiro 5). I agree with Debs and Monteiro’s argument defending the rationalist explanation of the Iraq war and the need to acknowledge exogenous as well as endogenous power shifts, although I did not support the war itself, because they give four rational points explaining why the United States went to war.

          Rationalists see war as a last resort because it is costly; therefore bargaining is the best option. But in the midst of the possible nuclearization of Iraq, the Bush Administration decided that a preventative war against Iraq was the best decision. Debs and Monteiro do not attempt to defend the Bush Administration’s decision to go to war but rather reflect back on it from a rationalist perspective. Their first point is that the United States wanted to prevent a shift in the balance of power that would result from Iraq’s nuclearization (Debs and Monteiro 1). I agree with this point because if Saddamm actually did have nuclear weapons and was allowed to continue developing WMD then they could declare nuclear war on other countries. The next point is that the events of 9/11 led leaders to worry about the country’s ability to detect security threats (Debs and Monteiro 2). I agree with this point because if Iraq’s possible nuclearization had occurred before 9/11 had happened then we probably would not have been so quick to go to war based on such unreliable evidence. Debs and Monteiro’s third point is that the United States went to war out of uncertainty and fear about Saddam possessing WMD (Debs and Monteiro 3). I agree with this point because the United States wanted proof that Iraq had nuclear weapons and when UN inspectors could not answer their questions, the uncertainty breed fear. Their final point is that rationalist theory can explain why the United States decided to go to war with Iraq instead of North Korea (Debs and Monteiro 4). I agree with this point because at the time North Korea did in fact have nuclear weapons and the likelihood of coming to an agreement was a lot less likely compared to Iraq. Debs and Monteiro reiterate throughout the article that although the rationalist theory can explain why the United States went to war with Iraq it does not support that decision. If rationalist theory takes into account endogenous power shifts that result in states militarizing we can better understand the decision to enter into war with Iraq (Debs and Monteiro 14).

          After Debs and Monteiro make their argument defending the rationalist theory they address David Lake’s argument that IR theory needs a behavioral revolution. I agree with the counter-arguments Debs and Monteiro make in response to David Lake’s criticism because although the rationalist explanation of the Iraq war is not perfect, it is still a widely accepted interpretation and gives reasonable reasons like imperfect information and commitment problems as the cause of war.

          I agree with Debs and Monteiro defending the rationalist explanation of what caused the Iraq war and the need to treat power shifts as exogenous and endogenous because they give four rational points that led the United States to war.